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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth District
Court in Utah County related to a refusal of the trial court to
enforce a stipulation and order of the Court entered and filed more
than five (5) years before. The refusal to enforce the stipulation
occurred when it was to be performed which was in July 1992. The
trial court was of the opinion that the stipulation was illegal and
thus

unenforceable, notwithstanding

that the

stipulation was

approved by the Court. (Record 551-548)
The Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(h).

Notice of Appeal was filed

with the trial court on December 14, 1992.

(Record 559)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal addresses the following issues:
1.

Is the stipulation at issue illegal?

Standard of Review: See below.
2.

Even if the stipulation is illegal, should the District

Court enforce the stipulation and order since it was made more than
five (5) years ago?
Standard of Review: See below
3.

If the stipulation is invalid, should the Court revise

or modify the stipulation to insure justice?
Standard of Review: See below
4.

Should Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees?
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Standard of Review: See below
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first three (3) issues have the same standard of review.
A motion on the pleadings is reviewed as a motion for summary
judgment and the standard for review is that the facts are to be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment
was granted with all reasonable inference from the facts in favor
of the non-prevailing party.

Review is de novo with no deference

to the findings or ruling of the trial court. Wincreqar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) and Daniel v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, , 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct App. 1989) cert denied 783 P.2d
53.
The standard of review on the issue of attorney's fees is a
matter of discretion with this court under Utah Code Title 30.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Both state and federal statutes are involved in this case.
Copies of the following statutes and regulations are found in the
addendum to this brief:
20 C.F.R. §404.2035 and 2040
Utah R. Civil P. 60(b)
Utah Code §78-45-4 is cited and states:
"Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support
her husband when he is in need."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties to this appeal were divorced July 18, 1985, by
stipulation and without a trial. (Record 403-410)

On January 7,

1987, a modification of the original decree was ordered based on
a second stipulation between the parties drafted by Plaintiff's
attorney and approved by the Court, but for some reason not
approved as to form by Defendant's attorney. (Record 469-473)

In

July 1992, Defendant complied with his part of the stipulation, but
Plaintiff refused. (Record 477)
Defendant brought an order to show cause to enforce the
Court's order and the stipulation. (Record 479)

Plaintiff plead

that the stipulation and order were illegal (Record 482-484) and
the Court refused to enforce either. (Record 504-506)

The Court

Commissioner struck the order to show cause.
Defendant
stipulation.

objected
(Record

and

moved

500-501)

The

the

Court

trial

to

judge

enforce

the

affirmed

the

commissioner, refused to enforce its order and refused to decide
other issues related to the stipulation and modification on the
grounds that the issues were not before the court. (Record 548-541
and Addendum)
In the January 7, 1987, order, the court required Defendant
to retire on social security retirement at the age of 62 so that
Plaintiff could receive social security for the children at a rate
higher than Defendant was required to pay under the Child Support

U

Guidelines. If Defendant did not retire at age 62, he was required
to place sufficient money into an interest bearing trust account
to equal $10,000 in 1999, which was to be paid to Plaintiff in
1999. (Record 469-463)
The Social security benefits are sufficient to pay both
Plaintiff and Defendant's support obligations under the Utah State
Support Guidelines. (Record 509-516)
If Defendant retired at age 62, Plaintiff was ordered to place
the social security into an interest bearing trust account and
withdraw each month only an amount equal to Defendant's court
ordered support. The balance of the funds were to be left to
accumulate interest until the funds had a present value equal to
$10,000 in 1999 dollars.

When this value was reached, Plaintiff

was to be allowed to removed $10,000 with any access to be paid to
Defendant. Plaintiff was relieved of her support obligation under
this arrangement. (Record 469-473)
Defendant complied with the Court's order and retired on
social security at age 62 in July 1992, however, Plaintiff refused
to comply with the agreement and Court order and took the position
that she had been informed by the Social Security Administration
that the stipulation was illegal since the social security benefit
for

the minor

children

was

being

utilized

to

pay

property

obligation of the parents. (Record 527-532)
Defendant requested the Court to either require Plaintiff to
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comply with the Court's order or to enter an order that would deem
the $10,000 obligation discharged. (Record 489-490)

The trial

court simply refused to do either and informed the parties that
they could re-litigate these issues.

(Record 504-506)

PROVISION INVOLVED
The provision of the stipulation and order which is at issue
in this appeal is contained in the Addendum to this brief in the
document entitled Order to Modify Decree of Divorce at pages 2 and
3 and in paragraph 3(c)(1-6).
FINDINGS OF THE COURT
The Honorable Judge Lynn Davis issued a written ruling in this
matter

in

which

he

sustained

the

decision

of

the

court

commissioner. A copy of the ruling is included in the Addendum and
is found in the record at pages 548 through 551, but is not
reproduced in the brief since the Court of Appeals must review this
matter de novo with no deference to the decisions of the trial
court. See Wingegar v. Froerer Corp., supra, and Daniel v. Deseret
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The trial court refused to enforce its order of January 7,
1987, struck a portion of its 1987 order and directed that the
parties re-litigate certain issues. (Record 504-506) The Court
Commissioner's order stated in pertinent part:
"8.

Paragraph 3c(l) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce
dated January 7, 1987, is hereby stricken.
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9.

Any further modification of the Order to Modify Decree
of Divorce with regard to the payment provisions of the
$10,000.00 obligation set forth in paragraph 3c must be
agreed to by the parties or re-litigated."

In fact, the trial court was of the opinion that certain
issues related to equitable relief was not before it and refused
to take any action. (Record 548-551 and Addendum).

Since this

appeal addresses legal issues and not the equitable issues of
whether or not the 1987 agreement should be modified at this time
in equity, a petition to modify was filed in the trial court after
the filing of this appeal so that facts could be obtained through
discovery. (Record 562-566)
The petition has not be set for trial and the trial court has
entered an order that reserves whether or not the petition to
modify should be stayed pending decision of this court. A copy of
this order is also found in the Addendum to this brief, but is not
a part of the record since the record was certified prior to entry
of the order. (See index filed February 17, 1993)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's argument is that the stipulation of the parties
in 1987 which was approved by the Court should be enforced at this
time because of justifiable reliance on the trial court's order by
the Appellant and because if Appellee intended to seek relief from
the stipulation, she had to do so within three (3) months of its
entry on January 7, 1987.

Finally, Appellant argues that the
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stipulation was not illegal when entered and that justice now
requires its enforcement.
ANALYSIS/DETAILS OF ARGUMENT
Stipulations/Contracts
Parties are bound by their stipulations unless they are timely
relieved from them by motion to the Court and in the interest of
justice and fair play. First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N.
Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) and Klein v. Klein,
544 P.2d 472 (1975) When a stipulation is clear, the trial court
should enforce it. Higbev v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984)
Appellee's position is that notwithstanding she freely and
voluntarily entered into an unambiguous agreement, she is not bound
by it because of the policy and regulations of the Social Security
Administration. Appellee takes a similar position to that set forth
in Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah 1990).
The Maxwell case was a stipulated divorce where the parties
agreed that the wife would be paid one-half (1/2) of the husband's
military retirement benefits. The husband paid his former spouse
benefits for awhile, but then discovered that the stipulation and
order of the divorce court was contrary to the federal Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) found in 10 U.S.C.
§1408 (1983). The dispute involved whether or not the wife was
entitled to gross or net benefits.
The husband in Maxwell argued on appeal that the USFSPA
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prohibits state courts from treating total or gross retired pay as
marital property. The Maxwell Court reviewed this argument under
the correction of error standard. The court held:
"We determine that Otis cannot avoid the decree by now
claiming mistake in entering into the stipulation. While a
property settlement agreement is not binding upon a trial
court in a divorce action, such agreement should be respected
and given considerable weight in the trial court's
determination of an equitable division of property
"Further, stipulations are conclusive and binding on the
parties, unless, upon timely notice and for good cause shown,
relief is granted therefrom
(Emphasis added.)
"The appropriate procedure to provide such notice and obtain
such relief from a judgment based on a mistakenly executed
stipulation is to file a motion pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) seeking relief because of 'mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect within three
months after the judgement, order of proceeding entered...
"We reject Otis7attempt on appeal of the trial court's orders
to show cause, which enforces the stipulated divorce decree,
to bootstrap himself to a 'mistake' argument that should have
been raised within three months after the original order was
entered...."
More than three (3) months has past since the entry of the
court's order approving the stipulation in this case. For almost
five (5) years, the parties relied on the stipulation. Appellant
acted based on the stipulation and retired early so as to avoid the
penalty contained in the stipulation and court order.
The reasoning of the Maxwell case is clearly applicable to the
facts of this case. Appellant should be entitled to rely on the
orders of the court, especially when compliance with such orders
profoundly affects Appellant's life and retirement plans.
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Rule 60(b) is aimed at the very problem which now faces
Appellant. If Appellee felt that the stipulation was a mistake
because of the status of the law or the policies and regulations
of the Social Security Administration, she should have complied
with Rule 60(b) and brought a motion to set aside her agreement
within three (3) months of its entry, not five (5) years. To wait
until Appellant performs under the stipulation is neither just nor
fair and therefore not proper grounds to set the stipulation aside.
Appellee has argued that this is a mixed issue of support and
property.

However, this mix of issues was considered by the Utah

Supreme court in Stetler v. Stetler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985) and
held to be a valid mixture since both property and child support
are matters subject to modification.

This same argument was made

in Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856 (Utah 1978)
The Defendant in Holmgren attempted to avoid liability by
claiming that the contracts which were sought to be enforced were
void because they violated both public policy and

statutory

prohibitions. The Court, however, rejected this argument and held
the Defendant to its various contracts.
Setting Aside/ Relief from Stipulations
Courts should look long and hard at a stipulation before
deciding to set it aside. In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah
1985), the Supreme Court held:
"It is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed
with the court was entered into inadvertently. Further,

10

although the trial court has certain discretion in providing
relief from a stipulation, if timely requested, see Klein v.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 'ordinarily courts are bound by
stipulations between parties
" Emphasis added.
The Dove court went on to say that a trial court must find
that the party

seeking to withdraw the

stipulation

did not

understand or agree to the stipulation. In this case, the Plaintiff
understood the stipulation and agreed to it. The stipulation is
clear and was drafted by Plaintiffs attorney. Any questions about
the

drafting

of

the

stipulation

must

be

construed

against

Plaintiff. See Parks Enterprises Inc. v. New Century Realty, 652
P.2d 918 (Utah 1982)
In the Klein case cited in Dove, the Supreme Court held:
"If there is any justification in law or equity for avoiding
or repudiating a stipulation, and he timely does so, he is
entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise, not." Emphasis
added.
In order for a party to withdraw a stipulation or for the
court to grant relief from a stipulation, Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure must be followed. The rules stated:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or
excusable
neglect;
(2)
newly
discovered
(3)
fraud
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1),(2),(3) or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or
taken.."
Even if the Court could set aside the judgment based in the
stipulation, it must be done within three (3) months and upon such
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terms as are

just. It is not just to force Appellant into

retirement, reduce his income and take from him the benefit of the
stipulation without some just compensation.
Mistake of Fact/Rescission
A mistake of fact may be sufficient grounds to set aside a
stipulation so long as the mistake of fact was not due to a lack
or a failure to exercise due diligence and it could not have been
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care. United Factors v. T.C.
Associates Inc, 445 P.2d 766 (Utah 1968)

Even then, it must be

done within three (3) months of entry of the judgment or order.
In order to claim avoidance of a stipulation and/or a contract
for mutual mistake, the mistake must be as to a material factual
matter which existed at the time of the making of the agreement.
Mooney v. GR and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987) The
Mooney court held:
"A party may rescind a contract when, at the time the contract
is made, the parties made a mutual mistake about a material
fact, the existence of which is a basic assumption of the
contract. If the parties harbor only mistaken expectations as
to the course of future events and their assumptions as to the
facts existing at the time of the contract are correct,
rescission is not proper."
Even if there was a mutual mistake as to a material fact, the
stipulation is only voidable and not void and the court would be
required to place the parties in their pre-contract positions
rather

than

simply

refuse

to

enforce

the

agreement. Robert

Lanqston, LTD. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987)
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Social Security Act
Plaintiff claims that the agreement between the parties is
unenforceable because the regulations of the Social Security
Administration, (see 20 C.F.R. §404.2035 and 2040) Copies of these
regulations are attached in the addendum for the court's review.
C.R.F. §404.2035 provides that a person who receives benefits
on behalf of another person must use the benefits solely for the
beneficiary and not for any other reason. This does not make the
stipulation of the parties illegal. Under Utah Code §78-45-4, a
woman has an obligation to support their minor children.

This

means that Plaintiff has an obligation to support these minor
children as well as does Defendant.

Under C.F.R. 404.2035,

however, Plaintiff receives 100% of the necessary care expenses of
the

children;

this

includes

Plaintiff's

share

as

well

as

Defendant's share of the total cost of caring for the children.
The stipulation is legal so long as the Plaintiff takes the
Social Security funds and expends them totally for the use and
benefit of the children. She must then take her share of the
children's support and place it in a trust account pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties.
Social Security benefits can be legally used for the needs of
the children while relieving Plaintiff of her duty to support the
children. The stipulation simply provides that Plaintiff's share
of the children's support is used to retire Defendant's lien
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obligation, not the social security.
Modification of the Stipulation
Appellant requested the trial court to reform the stipulation
and order

so as to do equity between

the parties. Divorce

proceedings are matters of equity and the appellant court is free
to consider the law and the facts when determining if an equitable
order should be entered by the Court. Stetler v. Stetler, 713 P.2d
699 (Utah 1985)

A trial court has considerable discretion in

adjusting the financial interests of parties in divorce. Cook v.
Cook, 739 P.2d 90 (Utah App. 1987) Rule 60(b) requires the court
to set aside its order "upon such terms as are just".
In Hansen V. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975), the Supreme
Court

held

that

it

has

jurisdiction

to

modify

property

distributions upon proof of changed circumstances and conditions.
The

changed

circumstances

however, prior to modification.
(1954).

or

conditions

must

be shown,

Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P. 2d 1211

Property settlements are not "sacrosanct" and are within

the power of the court to modify. Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299
(1980).
The court has the equitable jurisdiction necessary to modify
the decree in this case and to discharge the lien which was
established in the 1985 decree and modified by agreement as to the
method of payment in 1987.

U

ATTORNEY'S FEES
Appellant should be reimbursed for his costs and attorney's
fees since Appellee's refusal to comply with her agreement caused
Appellant's costs and attorney's fees. Title 30 of Utah Code and
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the legal
basis for an award of fees.
CONCLUSIONS
The trial court should have enforced the stipulation of the
parties which it approved in 1987. Defendant relied on the order
of the court. It is not now just or fair to simply refuse to
enforce the order of the court. There is sufficient legal basis to
enforce the stipulation or to do what justice requires.
Appellant requests this court to enforce the stipulation and
award him his attorney's fees and cost. Alternatively, Appellant
requests that this court enter an order deeming the $10,000.00
property award to Appellee satisfied with an award of attorney's
fees. The award of attorney's fees is equitable because under the
1987 order of the trial court, Appellant would have received
additional money from the trust account when Appellee was paid.

Respectfully Submitted

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that on this ^ 5 " day of May, 1993, four
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid to the following:
WILFORD N. HANSEN JR.
Attorney for Appellee
Utah Bar #1352
1172 East Highway 6, #7
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah, 84651-0067

C. ROBERT COLLINS
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ADDENDUM
This
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
F.
G.
H.

addendum contains copies of the following documents:
Findings of Fact (January 7, 1987)
Order Modifying Decree (January 7, 1987)
Order on Order to Show Cause (August 13, 1992)
Ruling on Defendant's Objection (November 5, 1992)
Order on Defendant's Objection (November 30, 1992)
Notice of Appeal (December 14, 1992)
Trial Court Order on Petition to Modify
(Entitled Order on Cross-Motions Related to Discovery)
20 C.F.R. §404.2035 & 2040
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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BILL HANSEN, #1352
CHRISTENSEN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Mountain View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, No. 7
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067
Telephone: (801) 465-9288
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS
CON*
vs.

FACT AND
NS OF LAW

•'.CiiilWo. 68,\
"
" U

ORLO B. LARSON,
Defendant.

This matter came before Howard Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of
the above-entitled Court, for trial pursuant to Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce and for contempt, on Thursday, November 6, 1986, at 2 p.m. Both Plaintiff
and Defendant were present and were represented by their respective counsel of
record.

The Stipulation of the parties was entered into the record and approved by

both parties.

Based thereon and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now makes

and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced by decree of the above-entitled Court on July

18, 1985.
2.
portion of

Defendant is presently
the Decree of

in arrears pursuant to the property

settlement

Divorce, paragraph 4, for the August, September, and

October, 1986 payments of $350 each, a total to date of $1,050. Said arrearages s h a l l be
paid by t h e property s e t t l e m e n t agreement below i f f u l l y performed.

1
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3--~, Plaintiff

has recorded her Trust Deed against the Defendant's

property

pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Plaintiff

necessary

to release

agrees to deposit with Provo Abstract Company the documents
her Trust

Deed

and

Notice

of

Interest

to Defendant's

real

property in or near Springlake, Utah within three (3) days of the entry of the Order,
to be delivered conditioned upon the Defendant's paying $31,500 to Plaintiff, the $350
due November 30, 1986, and the $350 due December 31, 1986 under the original Decree
and $350 monthly until the $31,500 is paid in full.
5.

Defendant agrees, in order to obtain Plaintiff's release of Trust Deed and

Notice of Interest,
a.

To pay to the Plaintiff

the sum of $31,500.00 cash on or before

January 5, 1987.
b.

To pay the regular property settlement payments of $350 beginning

November 30, 1986 and monthly thereafter as required pursuant to the original
Decree of Divorce until Plaintiff shall receive the $31,500.00 set forth above.
c.

To pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before September

30, 1999 as follows:
(1)

The benefits which the children of the parties may receive as a

result of Defendant's death or retirement shall be escrowed in a trust
account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork Branch, and shall be disbursed to
pay:
(a)

To the bank to pay fees of administering the account

(b)

To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child, child support

when due
(c)

The

balance

to

be

held

in

an

interest-bearing

trust

account, in the name of June Larson and credited for the payment of
2
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the property settlement payment of $10,000.00 until such time as the
balance held equals the then-present value of $10,000.00 due October
1, 1999, when calculated using Zion's Bank's prime rate at the time
of the calculation.
amount to satisfy

At the time the balance reaches the specified
the requirements set forth in this paragraph it

shall be immediately disbursed to Plaintiff

in satisfaction

of

the

$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be closed
and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to receive as a
result of Defendant's death or retirement will be paid to Defendant
or Defendant's estate. From that amount, Defendant will continue to
pay his child support obligation of $125.00 per month per child.
(2)

It is Defendant's stated intent to retire on or before July, 1992.

If Defendant has not retired by that time or the Social Security payment!^

XilU\

tt^%X-

^ ^ >

w&&

is not available for any reason, Defendant will immediately contribute
said escrow account an amount^that will generate $10,000 by 1999.
(3)

Defendant agrees to

waive all rights to personally receive said

Social Security payments intended for the benefit of the children until
such time as the $10,000.00 obligation

has been satisfied.

Defendant

shall timely sign any documents and perform any act that may be required
to protect the above-described fund.
(4)

Defendant

may pre-pay

the

present-day

value

of

the

said

$10,000.00 obligation without penalty at any time prior to the due date or
the date for performing any part of said obligation.
(5)

Default

shall

occur

if

the

above-described

account

is

not

established by July, 1992, or if for any reason any monthly payment to
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said account is not made during the month whejn^due or, if in any month,
a contribution is not made toward the property settlement.
(6)

In the event of failure to abide by provisions, Plaintiff

may

accelerate the balance then due and owing on the property settlement and
proceed to collect the same, together with reasonable costs and attorney's
fees.
6.

Defendant's action with respect to child custody is hereby dismissed.

~Hio •

/Thi'Mr^n shall remain in the custody of the PlaJA*ifT.
7.

This Stipulation and Modification is entered into upon the representation

of Defendant that he is in severe financial difficulty and is on the verge of bankruptcy
if this agreement is not entered into.
8.

Each party claims to be entitled to various items of personal property

awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which have not been delivered.
9.

Each party is to present to the other within five days of the date of

signing and entry of the Order to Modify Decree, a list of those items of personal
property claimed to have been awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which
have not been delivered.

Each party is ordered

not to dispose of any

personal

property of the other or in which the other party claims an interest and within ten
days after receiving the list requested American Towing will pick up said items at each
parties residence and will transport the items to each parties residence.

The parteis

will split the cost of towing.
10.

Plaintiff agrees to waive any right to hay which she has under paragraph

6 of the original Decree of Divorce.
11.

Defendant shall be in default under the Agreement of the parties if any

condition is not performed when required or any of the obligations set forth above are
not paid when due.

In the event of a default, the Agreement of the parties shall be
4

21

null and void and the parties shall revert to the provisions set forth in the original
Decree of Divorce regarding the property settlement.
12.

Each party is to bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees in this

particular matter.
13.
Defendant's

Neither

party

Petition

r e s o l v e d -between

presented

or Plaintiff's

Ihiiimlvcs—tire

C h i l d r e n ^ p r o p e r t y , rf>mrc\]

tnvp?

evidence
Answer

oiher

inH

as

to

other

matters

contained

thereto, the parties appearing

rTOTTCTs—including child

in

to have

custody,—vnitntion,^

hft^.

The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters
its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction in the above-entitled matter.

2.

The

Defendant's

severe

financial

circumstances

constitute

a

material

change of circumstances which justify a modification in the property settlement portion
of the Decree of Divorce.
1.
^.
and

The frhilrlrrn ?hn11 remain in the custody of the Plaintiff.
The provisions of the Stipulation of the parties as entered into the record

as set forth

in the Findings

of

Fact

above are hereby

approved

as

reasonable and are to be incorporated in an Order to Modify Decree of Divorce.
other matters are hereby dismissed.
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being
All

DATED this

day of December, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER
Approved as to form:

MARK ROBINSON
Attorney for Defendant
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Bill Hansen, #1352
CHRISTENSEN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Mountain View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Nos. 7 & 19
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067
Telephone: (801) 465-9288
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE
YS.

Civil No. 68,661
ORLO B. LARSON,
Defendant.
This matter came before Howard Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of
the above-entitled Court, for trial pursuant to Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce and for contempt, on Thursday, November 6, 1986, at 2 p.m. Both Plaintiff
and Defendant
record.

were present and were represented by their respective counsel of

The Stipulation of the parties was entered into the record and approved by

both parties. The Court has made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Based thereon and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

The Decree of Divorce entered in the above-entitled Court on July 18,

1985 is modified as set forth herein.
2.
necessary

Plaintiff is ordered to deposit with Provo Abstract Company the documents
to release her Trust Deed and Notice of

Interest

to Defendant's

real

property in or near Springlake, Utah, within three (3) days of the entry of this Order,
to be delivered conditioned upon the Defendant's paying $31,500 to Plaintiff, the $350
1
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due November 30, 1986, and the $350 due December 31, 1986 under the original Decree
and $350 monthly until the $31,500 is paid in full.
3.

It is ordered that Defendant, in order to obtain Plaintiff's release of Trust

Deed and Notice of Interest,
a.

Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $31,500.00 cash on or before January

5, 1987.
b.

Pay the regular property settlement

payments of $350 beginning

November 30, 1986 and monthly thereafter as required pursuant to the original
Decree of Divorce until Plaintiff shall receive the $31,500.00 set forth above.
c.

Pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00 on or before September

30, 1999 as follows:
(1)

The benefits which the children of the parties may receive as a

result of Defendant's death or retirement are ordered escrowed in a trust
account at Zion's Bank, Spanish Fork Branch, and are ordered disbursed to
pay:
(a)

To the bank to pay fees of administering the account

(b)

To Plaintiff to pay $125 per month per child, child support

when due
(c)

The balance is ordered held in an interest-bearing trust

account, in the name of June Larson and credited for
payment

of

the

property

settlement

payment

of

the

$10,000.00

until such time as the balance held equals the then-present
value of $10,000.00 due October 1, 1999, when calculated using
Zion's Bank's prime rate at the time of the calculation.

At the

time the balance reaches the specified amount to satisfy the
requirements set forth in this paragraph it is ordered
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immediately disbursed to Plaintiff in satisfaction of the
$10,000.00 property settlement obligation, the account will be
closed and all of the benefits which the children are entitled to
receive as a result of Defendant's death or retirement will be
paid to Defendant or Defendant's estate.

From that amount,

Defendant will continue to pay his child support obligation of
$125.00 per month per child.
(2)

If

Defendant

has not retired

by July,

1992, or the Social

Security payment is not available for any reason, Defendant is ordered to
immediately

contribute

to said

escrow

account

an

amount

that

will

generate $10,000 by 1999.
(3)

Defendant

shall waive all rights to personally

receive said

Social Security payments intended for the benefit of the children until
such time as the $10,000.00 obligation has been satisfied.

Defendant

shall timely sign any documents and perform any act that may be required
to protect the above-described fund.
(4)

Defendant

may pre-pay

the present-day

value of

the said

$10,000.00 obligation without penalty at any time prior to the due date or
the date for performing any part of said obligation.
(5)

Default

shall

occur

if

the

above-described

account

is

not

established by July, 1992, or if for any reason any monthly payment to
said account is not made during the month when due or, if in any month,
a contribution is not made toward the property settlement.
(6)

In the event of failure to abide by provisions, Plaintiff

may

accelerate the balance then due and owing on the property settlement and

3
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proceed to collect the same, together with reasonable costs and attorney's
fees.
4.

It is ordered that Plaintiff retain custody of the minor children of the

parties, subject to Defendant's rights of visitation as specified in the original Decree
of Divorce.
5.

Each party is ordered to present to the other within five days of the date

of signing and entry of this Order to Modify Decree, a list of those items of personal
property claimed to have been awarded under the original Decree of Divorce which
have not been delivered.

Each party is ordered not to dispose of any personal

property of the other or in which the other party claims an interest and within ten
days after receiving the list requested American Towing will pick up said items at each
party's residence and will transport the items to each party's residence.

The parties

will split the cost of towing.
6.

Paragraph 6 of the original Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to

eliminate the requirement that Defendant provide Plaintiff any further hay.
7.

Defendant shall be in default under the Agreement of the parties if any

condition is not performed when required or any of the obligations set forth above are
not paid when due.

In the event of a default, the Agreement of the parties shall be

null and void and the parties shall revert to the provisions set forth in the original
Decree of Divorce regarding the property settlement.
8.

Each party is to bear his or her own costs and attorney's fees in this

particular matter.
9.

All other matters contained in Defendant's Petition or Plaintiff's answer

thereto, including child custody, visitation, children's property, records, taxes, and hay
are hereby dismissed, the parties appearing to have resolved said matters between
themselves.
4
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DATED this

" 7 day of ] 2 e « n $ e ? T 9 8 ^
BY THE COURT:

/ ^
Approved as to form:

MARK F. ROBINSON
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DOMESTIC RE£ATI6KS COMMISSIONER

WILFORD N. HANSEN, JR., P:C
Bill Hansen, #1352
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mountain View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
Post Office Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067
Telephone: (801) 465-9288
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON, nka JUNE BECKMAN,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.

Howard H. Maetani, Commissioner

ORLO B. LARSON,
Defendant.

Civil No. 68,661

This matter came before the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Domestic Relations
Commissioner of the above-entitled Court pursuant to Defendant's Order to Show Cause
and Plaintifrs Counter Order to Show Cause this 28th day of July, 1992, at the hour of
1:30 p.m.

Plaintiff was present and was represented by Bill Hansen.

present and was represented by Marilyn Moody Brown.

Defendant was

Counsel conferred

with

Commissioner Maetani in chambers regarding the applicable law pertaining to trust
accounts for child support and the use of the minor childrens' social security monies to
discharge personal obligations of the Defendant.

Based thereon, and good cause

appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

An Order modifying the Decree of Divorce was entered on January 7, 1987.

2.

Pursuant to said Order, upon Defendant's retirement, any social security

1
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benefits to be received by the parties' minor children would be credited towards
Defendant's child support obligation.
3.

The children, Karalee Larson and Oralee Larson, receive social security

benefits of $312.00 each per month on the account of Leonard Beckman, their stepfather.
4.

Said children received $470.00 each per month for the months of June and

July, 1992, on the combined account of Mr. Beckman and Defendant, a difference of
$158.00 per month pCT child.
5.

It is ordered that said sum is the exclusive property of each of the

children, and that Defendant's child support obligation for said children during those
months is satisfied.
6.

It is further ordered that the childrcns' social security benefits are not

required to be placed in a trust account, but may be paid directly to the children.
7.

Furthermore, it is ordered that said funds arc not lawfully available to

discharge Defendant's personal indebtedness to the Plaintiff.
8.

Paragraph 3c(l) of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce dated January

7, 1987, is hereby stricken.
9.

Any further modification of the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce with

regard to the payment provisions of the $10,000.00 obligation set forth in paragraph 3c
must be agreed to by the parties or re-litigated.
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DATED this

/3
'-> day of August, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

jk.

HOWARD H. MAETANI
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARILYN Mj60DY BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION TO RULING OF
COURT COMMISSIONER,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ENFORCE DECREE OF
MODIFICATION, TO SET ASIDE
COMMISSIONER'S RULING & FOR
OTHER RELIEF

JUNE LARSON,
Plaintiff,

ORLO LARSON,

CASE NO. 68661
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on September 30th, 1992 for oral argument on
Defendant's Objection to the Ruling of the Court Commissioner. Plaintiff was present and
was represented by Bill Hansen, Esq. Defendant was present and was represented by C.
Robert Collins, Esq.
The Court took the matter under advisement. The Court having been fully advised in
the premises now enters its decision:
I.
COMMISSIONER'S RULING
At issue before the Court is a provision in the Order to Modify Decree of Divorce.
The Modification order provides that upon retirement or death of the defendant, the social
security benefits which would accrue the minor children of the parties be held in an escrow
account. Defendant was to be relieved of additional child support obligation. It was
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anticipated that plaintiff would be able to withdraw from the escrow account the amount of
defendant's child support obligation. The remaining funds were to be left in the escrow
account to accumulate over a seven year period. At the end of the seven year period, the
plaintiff would be paid $10,000.00 out of the escrow account and the remaining funds were
to be the defendants. The above provision was to go into effect by July, 1992, or defendant
was foreclosed from availing himself of this provision.1
On or about June 24, 1992, defendant filed with the Court an Order to Show Cause
against the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the above described provision in the modification
decree. On July 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court Commissioner for a hearing on
the Order to Show Cause. The Court Commissioner ruled 1) that the Court would not
approve of the provision at that time due to additional information concerning the use of
social security benefits, 2) that the order to show cause was stricken, and 3) that the social
security payments would be subtracted from defendant's support obligation. All other issues
were left for the parties to either work out or relitigate in the future. The Court
Commissioner did not rule on the payment of the $10,000.00 dollars.
On or around August 7, 1992, Defendant filed an Objection to Ruling of Court

*The Court also notes that the original divorce decree also provides that social security
payments for the support of the minor children in excess of the child support award would
reduce the amount of indebtedness on the property settlement between the parties. See
Decree of Divorce, 1 3, Dated July 18, 1985.
2

3.3

Commissioner Defendant's objection was supported by a Motion to Enforce Decree of
Modification, Set Aside Commissioner's Ruling, and for Other Relief.

n.
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S RULINQ
The Court affirms the Ruling of the Court Commissioner. At the July 28th hearing,
the Court Commissioner refused to approve or give effect to the provision in question due to
federal restrictions on the use of social security support funds. This Court agrees with the
Commissioner's reasoning. A child's Social Security benefit may not be used to discharge a
parent's personal debt not related to the support of the child. Fauver v. Hansen. 803 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Utah App. 1990). "Utah Courts have long held that the right to receive child
support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered away by the
child's parent or parents." Id.
The Social Security regulations dealing with payments made to minor children of
retired employees is in line with Utah's approach to child support. 20 CFR Ch. Ill §
404.2035 states that a representative payee, (i.e. guardian or parent of minor child in this
case) "has the responsibility to use the payments he or she receives only for the use and
benefit of the beneficiary . . . " Use of social security benefits to retire a debt of defendant
does not meet the mandate of this section and will not be enforced by this court.
Additionally, neither party has the power to bargain away a right belonging exclusively to the
children. For these reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner's ruling.
3
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n.
OTHER MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT
In addition to filing an objection to the Court Commissioner's ruling, defendant also
filed a motion to enforce the modification decree, to set aside the Court Commissioner's
ruling and other relief. These motions are not properly before the Court. The Court has
already considered defendant's objection to the Court Commissioner's ruling. The Court will
not entertain any matter outside the scope of an objection to the Court Commissioner's
ruling. Defendant's motions to enforce the modification decree and to set aside the Court
Commissioner's ruling are hereby denied.
Dated, at Provo, this Jj^_ day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT

4udge Lynn W. Davfs
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Uiah County,fct*U»«f Utah

CARiviA B. SMITH, Clsrk
Deputy

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah State Bar #5455
405 East State Road
P.O. Box 243
American Fork, UT 84003
(801) 756-0554
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON,
Plaintiff,

]
|
)
|

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
AND OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S
RULING

vs.
ORLO LASON,

|
Case No. 68661
]
i •' • Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on regularly before the undersigned
judge of the above entitled Court for oral argument on September
30,

1992, Plaintiff

appearing with her attorney, Bill Hansen,

Defendant appearing with his attorney, C. ROBERT COLLINS, the Court
having taken this matter under advisement, having reviewed the
files and records herein, having made its ruling under date of
November 5, 1992, and deeming itself fully advised,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's
ruling and subsequent Order on Order to Show Cause filed on or
about August 13, 1992, shall be and is hereby confirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court declines to rule on
balance of Defendant's motions for and upon the grounds that the
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court believes that the other matters are not properly before the
court.

^ A

___,

£ day of November, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
_ _ ^

This is to certify that on this / / day of November 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
prepaid to the following:
Bill Hansen
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 67
Payson, UT 84651

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
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4™ DISTRICT COURT
STATE 0 r irR:i

DEC

14 2 ^ m ^

C* ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah State Bar #5455
405 East State Road
P.O. Box 243
American Fork, UT 84003
(801) 756-0554
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON,

]

Plaintiff & Appellee,

Case No. 68,661

vs.

i

NOTICE OF APPEAL

i

Judge Lynn Davis

ORLO LARSON,
Defendant & Appellant.
NOTICE

IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant and Appellant Orlo

Larson, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final judgment of
the Honorable Judge Lynn Davis, entered in this matter on November
30, 1992, and entitled Order on Defendant's Motion and Objection to
Commissioner's Ruling.
Dated this 9th

The appeal is taken from the entire order.

day of December, 1992.

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This hereby certifies that on the jL/

day of December, 1992,

the undersigned mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
Bill Hansen
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 67
Payson, Utah, 84651

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant

39

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Defendant
Utah State Bar #5455
405 East State Road
P.O. Box 243
American Fork, UT 84003
(801) 756-0554
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JUNE LARSON, nka BEKMAN,

)
I

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS
RELATED TO DISCOVERY ISSUES

VS.

i

Case No. 68661

ORLO LARSON,

i

Commissioner Howard Maetani

Plaintiff,

Defendant.
THIS MATTER having come on regular before the undersigned
commissioner of the above entitled Court on May 4, 1993, for oral
arguments on Defendant's Motion to Compel and upon Plaintiff's
Motion for Protective Order, Defendant appearing with his attorney
of record, Plaintiff not appearing, but being represented by her
attorney of record, the Court having heard the arguments of
counsel, having reviewed the files and records herein and deeming
itself fully advised, makes the following:
1.

There is currently pending in the Court of Appeals an

appeal related to whether or not the Court should enforcement a
prior stipulation of the parties related to a $10,000 property lien
and social security. The Court has previously ruled that the
provision is illegal and has refused to enforce it. Defendant has
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appealed the enforceability of the stipulation.
2.

The Defendant has also filed a petition to modify the

original order of this court related to the $10,000 property lien
based on equity and his position that the Court would not consider
his equitable arguments when the issue of the enforceability of the
lien provision was before the Court because of statements by the
court that this issue was not properly before the court at that
time.
3.

The subject matter of the appeal and the petition for

modification is the same, however, the issues are difference; i.e.
illegality of the provision verse equitable relief to deem the
$10,000 satisfied though not paid. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over the first issue and this court has jurisdiction
over the second.
4.

In connection with the petition to modify, Defendant has

served interrogatories and requests for documents on Plaintiff.
5.

When Plaintiff did not answered Defendant's discovery, he

filed a motion to compel. Plaintiff responded by answering a few of
the interrogatories, but objected

to most as burdensome and

irrelevant.
6.

The Court's inclination is to stay the petition to modify

until a decision from the Court of Appeals is made, however,
Plaintiff requested the Court not to do so and that the petition to
modify proceed.
7.

The Court reviewed the interrogatories and requests for

documents and finds that they are not burdensome and are relevant
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to the petition to modify which is before this court.
8.

The parties

stipulated

that

Plaintiff

may

have an

additional 30 days to respond to the requested discovery.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff shall answer the requested interrogatories and

produce the requested documents on or before June 4, 1993.
2.

The Court reserves the right on its own motion to stay

the petition to modify at the time of pre-trial hearing after
review of the status of the appeal at that time.
3.

The issues of attorney shall be reserved.

4.

The motion for protective order is denied

5.

The motion to compel is granted.

Dated this ff

day of May, 1993.

^Commissioners~Tfoward Maetani
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on this \£
day of May, 1993 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Mountain View East Professional Plaza
1172 East Hwy. 6, Suite 7
P.O. Box 67
Payson, UT 84651-0067

C. ROBERT COLLINS
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§ 404.2035

20 CFR Ch. Ill (4-1-91 Edition)

If he or she objects to either proposed
*itlon, the person may—
(1) Review the evidence upon which
.he proposed actions will be based; and
(2) Submit any additional evidence
egarding the proposed actions.
(b) If the person objects to the proDosed actions, we will review our proised determinations and consider any
idditlonal information given to us. We
vill then issue our determinations. If
he person is dissatisfied with* either
letermination, he or she may request
i reconsideration.
(c) If the person does not object to
he proposed actions, we will issue our
^terminations. If the person is dlssatsfled with either determination, he or
he may request a reconsideration.
47 FR 30472. July 14. 1982; 47 PR 32936.
uly 30, 1982]
404.2035 lteHpoitMibilitkH of a representative payee.
A representative payee has a responibility to—
(a) Use the payments he or she reeives only for the use and benefit of
he beneficiary in a manner and for
he purposes he or she determines.
~<der the guidelines in this subpart,
J be in the best interests of the beneiciary;
(b) Notify us of any event that will
ffect the amount of benefits the benficiary receives or the right of the
eneficiary to receive benefits;
(c) Submit to us, upon our request, a
itten report accounting for the benfits received; and
(d) Notify us of any change in his or
er circumstances that would affect
erformance of the payee responslbilles.
404.2040

Use of benefit payments.

*a) Current maintenance. (1) We will
msider that payments we certify to a
jpresentative payee have been used
>r the use and benefit of the benefici-y if they are used for the benefiary's current maintenance. Current
aintenance includes cost incurred in
Gaining food, shelter, clothing, mediil care, and personal comfort items.
Example: An aged beneficiary Is entitled
a monthly Social Security benefit of
00. Her son. who Is her payee, disburses
r benefits in the following manner:

Rent and utilities
Medical
Food

•

$201
IS
«

Clothing (coat)

SS

Savings
Miscellaneous

30
30

The above expenditures would represent proper disbursements on behalf
of the beneficiary.
(2> Notwithstanding the provisions
of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, if i
beneficiary Is a member of an Aid to
Families With Dependent Children
(APDC) assistance unit, we do not consider it inappropriate for a representative payee to make the benefit payments available to the APDC assistance unit.
(b) Institutional
care. If a benefldary is receiving care in a Federal
State, or private institution because of
mental or physical incapacity, current
maintenance includes the customary
charges made by the institution, as
well as expenditures for those items
which will aid in the beneficiary's recovery or release from the institution
or expenses for personal needs which
will improve the beneficiary's conditions while in the institution.
Example: An institutionalized beneficiary
is entitled to a monthly Social Security benefit of $320. The institution charges $700 i
month for room and board. The beneficiary's brother, who is the payee, learns the
beneficiary needs new shoes and does not
have any funds to purchase miscellaneous
Items at the institution's canteen.
The payee takes his brother to town and
buys him a pair of shoes for $29. He alio
takes the beneficiary to see a movie which
costs $3. When they return to the instltu
tlon, the payee gives his brother $3 to be
used at the canteen.
Although the payee normally withholds
only $25 a month from Social Security benefit for the beneficiary's personal needs, ths
month the payee deducted the above expenditures and paid the institution $10 lea
than he usually pays.
The above expenditures represent whit
we would consider to be proper expenditures for current maintenance.
(c) Support of legal dependents. If
the current maintenance needs of the
beneficiary are met, the payee may
use part of the payments for the sup-
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Social Security Administration, HHS
port of the beneficiary's legally dependent spouse, child, and/or parent.
Example: A disabled beneficiary receives a
Veterans Administration (VA) benefit of
$325 and a Social Security benefit of $525.
The beneficiary resides in a VA hospital and
his VA benefits are sufficient to provide for
all of his needs; I.e.. cost of care and personal needs. The beneficiary's legal dependents—his wife and two children—have a
total Income of $250 per month in Social Security benefits. However, they have ex*
penses of approximately $450 per month.
Because the VA benefits are sufficient tq
meet the beneficiary's needs, It would be appropriate to use part of his Social Security
benefits to support his dependents.
(d) Claims of creditors. A payee may
not be required to use benefit payments to satisfy a debt of the beneficiary, if the debt arose prior to the first
month for which payments are certified to a payee. If the debt arose prior
to this time, a payee may satisfy it
only if the current and reasonably
foreseeable needs of the beneficiary
are met.
Example: A retroactive Social Security
check in the amount of $1,640, representing
benefits due for July 1080 through January
1081. was Issued on behalf of the beneficiary
to the beneficiary's aunt who is the representative payee. The check was certified in
February 1981.
The nursing home, where the beneficiary
resides, submitted a bill for $1,139 to the
payee for maintenance expenses the beneficiary Incurred during the period from June
1980 through November 1980. (Maintenance
charges for December 1980 through February 1981 had previously been paid.)
Because the benefits were not required for
the beneficiary's current maintenance, the
payee had previously saved over $500 for
the beneficiary and the beneficiary had no
foreseeable needs which would require large
disbursement, the expenditure for the
maintenance charges would be consistent
with our guidelines.
(47 FR 30472. July 14. 1982, as amended at
$4 FR 35483. Aug. 28. 1989)

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(h) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion

under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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